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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Ramsey (1928), optimal growth models have played a
central role in modern macroeconomics. Classical growth theory relies on the as-
sumption that labor is supplied in fixed amounts, although the original paper of
Ramsey did include the disutility of labor as an argument in consumers’ utility
functions. Subsequent research in applied macroeconomics (theories of business
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cycle fluctuations) has reassessed the role of the labor-leisure choice in the pro-
cess of growth. Nowadays, intertemporal models with elastic labor continue to
be the standard setting used to model many issues in applied macroeconomics.
Our purpose is to prove existence of competitive equilibrium for the basic
neoclassical model with elastic labor with less stringent assumptions than in the
literature using some recent results (see Le Van and Saglam (2004)) concerning
the existence of Lagrange multipliers in infinite dimensional spaces and their
representation as a summable sequence.
Lagrange multiplier techniques have facilitated considerably the analysis of
constrained optimization problems. The application of these techniques in the
analysis of intertemporal models inherits most of the tractability found in a finite
setting. However, the passage to an infinite dimensional setting raises additional
questions. These questions concern both the extension of the Lagrangean in
an infinite dimensional setting as well as the representation of the Lagrange
multipliers as a summable sequence.
Previous work addressing existence of competitive equilibrium in intertem-
poral models attacks the problem of existence from an abstract point of view.
Following the early work of Peleg and Yaari (1970), this approach is based on
separation arguments applied to arbitrary vector spaces (see Bewley (1972), Be-
wley (1982), Aliprantis, et al. (1990), Dana and Le Van (1991)). The advantage
of this approach is that it yields general results capable of application in a wide
variety of models. However, it requires a high level of abstraction and some
strong assumptions.
Le Van and Vailakis (2004) in order to prove the existence of competitive
equilibrium in a model with a representative agent and elastic labor supply im-
pose relatively strong assumptions.1 In this paper, the existence of equilibrium
cannot be established by using marginal utilities since we may have boundary
solutions.
Recently, Le Van, et al. (2007) extended the canonical representative agent
Ramsey model to include heterogeneous agents and elastic labor supply and
supermodularity is used to establish the convergence of optimal paths. The
novelty in their work is that relatively impatient consumers have their con-
sumption and leisure converging to zero and any Pareto optimal capital path
converges to a limit point as time tends towards infinity. However, if the limit
points of the Pareto optimal capital paths are not bounded away from zero,
then their convergence results do not ensure existence of equilibrium.
To obtain the convergence results, they impose strong assumptions which
are not used in our paper.2 Following the Negishi approach (1960), our strat-
egy for tackling the question of existence relies on exploiting the link between
1They assumed
u(,)

→ +∞ as  → 0 for showing ct > 0, lt > 0 and uccuc ≤
ucl
ul
for the
proof of kt > 0 for all t.
2Le Van, et al. (2007) assume that the cross-partial derivative uicl has constant sign,
uic(x, x) and u
i
l(x, x) are non-increasing in x, the production function F is homogenous of
degree α ≤ 1 and FkL ≥ 0 (Assumptions U4, F4, U5, F5).
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Pareto-optima and competitive equilibria. We show that there exist Lagrange
multipliers which can be used as a price system such that together with the
Pareto-optimal solution they constitute an equilibrium with transfers. These
transfers depend on the individual weights involved in the social welfare func-
tion. An equilibrium exists provided that there is a set of welfare weights such
that the corresponding transfers equal zero. The model in which we establish
existence is with complete contingent commodity Arrow-Debreu markets (as
opposed to trading in sequential markets) and the prices and transfers are suf-
ficient for decentralizing the optimal allocation. We also do not require, with
additional assumptions, as in Le Van, et al. (2007) that the optimal capital
stock converges in the long run to a strictly positive value in order to get prices
in `1+.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the model
and provide sufficient conditions on the objective function and the constraint
functions so that Lagrange multipliers can be presented by an `1+ sequence. We
characterize some dynamic properties of the Pareto optimal paths of capital and
of consumption-leisure. In particular, we prove that the optimal consumption
and leisure paths of the more impatient agents will converge to zero in the long
run (see Becker (1980) for a similar result in a sequential trading model) with a
very elementary proof compared to the one in Le Van, et al. (2007) which uses
supermodularity for lattice programming. In section 3, we prove the existence of
competitive equilibrium by using the Negishi approach and the inward boundary
fixed point theorem.
2 The model
We consider an intertemporal model with m ≥ 1 consumers and one firm. There
is a single produced good in each period that is either consumed or invested as
capital. The preferences of each consumer, i = 1, . . . ,m, take the additive form:∑∞
t=0 β
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t) where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. At date t, consumer i
consumes cit of the good, enjoys a quantity of leisure l
i
t and supplies a quantity
of labor Lit which are normalized so that l
i
t+L
i
t = 1. Production possibilities are
given by the gross production function F and a physical depreciation δ ∈ (0, 1).
Denote F (kt,
∑m
i=1 L
i
t) + (1− δ)kt = f(kt,
∑m
i=1 L
i
t).
We next specify a set of restrictions on preferences and the production tech-
nology.3
U1: ui is continuous, concave, increasing on R+× [0, 1] and strictly increasing,
strictly concave on R++ × (0, 1).
U2: ui(0, 0) = 0.
3We relax some important assumptions in the literature. For example, Bewley (1972)
assumes that the production set is a convex cone (Theorem 3, page 525). Bewley (1982)
assumes the strict positiveness of derivatives of utility functions on RL+ (strict monotonicity
assumption, page 240).
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U3: ui is twice continuously differentiable on R++× (0, 1) with partial deriva-
tives satisfying the Inada conditions: limc→0 uic(c, l) = +∞, ∀l ∈ (0, 1] and
liml→0 uil(c, l) = +∞, ∀c > 0.
We extend the utility functions on R2 by imposing ui(c, l) = −∞ if (c, l) ∈
R2 \ {R+ × [0, 1]}.
The assumptions on the production function F : R2+ → R+ are as follows:
F1: F is continuous, concave, increasing on R2+ and strictly increasing, strictly
concave on R2++.
F2: F (0, 0) = 0.
F3: F is twice continuously differentiable on R2++ with partial derivatives satis-
fying the Inada conditions: limk→0 Fk(k, L) = +∞, ∀L > 0, limk→+∞ Fk(k,m) <
δ and limL→0 FL(k, L) = +∞, ∀k > 0.
We extend the function F over R2 by imposing F (k, L) = −∞ if (k, L) /∈ R2+.
For any initial condition k0 ≥ 0, when a sequence k = (k0, k1, k2, . . . , kt, . . .)
is such that 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m) for all t, we say it is feasible from k0 and we
denote the class of feasible capital paths by Π(k0). Let (c1, c2, . . . , ci, . . . , cm)
where ci = (ci0, c
i
1, . . . , c
i
t, . . .) denotes the vector of consumption and
(l1, l2, . . . , li, . . . , lm) where li = (li0, l
i
1, . . . , l
i
t, . . .) the vector of leisure of all
agents. A pair of consumption-leisure sequences (ci, li) =(cit, l
i
t)
∞
t=0 is feasible
from k0 ≥ 0 if there exists a sequence k ∈ Π(k0) that satisfies ∀t,
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ f
(
kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)
)
and 0 ≤ lit ≤ 1.
The set of feasible consumption-leisure sequences from k0 is denoted by
∑
(k0).
Assumption F3 implies that
fk(+∞,m) = Fk(+∞,m) + (1− δ) < 1,
fk(0,m) = Fk(0,m) + (1− δ) > 1.
It follows that there exists k > 0 such that: (i) f(k,m) = k , (ii) k > k implies
f(k,m) < k, (iii) k < k implies f(k,m) > k. Therefore for any k ∈ Π(k0), we
have 0 ≤ kt ≤ max(k0, k). Thus, a feasible sequence k is in `∞+ which in turn
implies that any feasible sequence (c, l) belongs to `∞+ × [0, 1]∞.
We now give the characterization of the competitive equilibrium. For each
consumer i, let αi > 0 denote the share of the profit of the firm which is owned
by consumer i. We have
∑m
i=1 α
i = 1. Let ϑi > 0 be the share of the initial
endowment owned by consumer i. Clearly,
∑m
i=1 ϑ
i = 1, and ϑi k0 is the
endowment of consumer i.
Definition 1 Let k0 > 0. A competitive equilibrium for this model consists of
a sequence of prices p∗ = (p∗t )
∞
t=0 for the consumption good, a wage sequence
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w∗ = (w∗t )
∞
t=0 for labor, a price r for the initial capital stock k0 and an allocation
{c∗i,k∗, l∗i,L∗i} such that
i)
c∗ ∈ `∞+ , l∗i ∈ `∞+ ,L∗i ∈ `∞+ ,k∗ ∈ `∞+ ,
p∗ ∈ `1+\{0},w∗ ∈ `1+\{0}, r > 0.
ii) For every i, (c∗i, l∗i) is a solution to the problem
max
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t)
s.t
∑∞
t=0 p
∗
t c
i
t +
∑∞
t=0 w
∗
t l
i
t ≤
∑∞
t=0 w
∗
t+ϑ
irk0 + αipi∗
where pi∗ is the maximum profit of the single firm.
iii) (k∗,L∗) is a solution to the firm’s problem
pi∗ = max
∞∑
t=0
p∗t [f(kt, Lt)− kt+1]−
∞∑
t=0
w∗tLt − rk0
st 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt, Lt), 0 ≤ Lt,∀t
iv) Markets clear: ∀t,
m∑
t=1
c∗it + k
∗
t+1 = f
(
k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
L∗it
)
,
l∗it + L
∗i
t = 1, L
∗
t =
m∑
i=1
Li
∗
t and k
∗
0 = k0.
Observe that we have for any i
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗tt , l
∗i
t ) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(0, 1) =
ui(0, 1)
1− βi
In other words, in equilibrium, every agent is individually rational. We will
therefore study the individually rational Pareto optimum problem (or Pareto
problem, in short). We show that the Lagrange multipliers are in `1+. Then these
multipliers will be used to define a price and wage system for the equilibrium.
Let ∆ = {η1, η2, . . . , ηm|ηi ≥ 0 and
∑m
i=1 ηi = 1}. Given a vector of welfare
weights η ∈ ∆, define the Pareto problem
max
m∑
i=1
ηi
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(cit, l
i
t) (Q)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ f
(
kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)
)
,∀t
cit ≥ 0, lit ≥ 0, lit ≤ 1, ∀i,∀t
kt ≥ 0, ∀t, k0 given,
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and the individual rationality constraints:
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(ctt, l
i
t) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(0, 1) =
ui(0, 1)
1− βi , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
Note that, for all k0 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ kt ≤ max(k0, k), then 0 ≤ cit ≤ f(max(k0, k),m) ≡
A, ∀t, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m. Therefore, the sequence (ui)n =
∑n
i=1 β
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t) is in-
creasing and bounded and will converge. Thus, we can write
m∑
i=1
ηi
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(cit, l
i
t) =
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t).
Let x = (c,k, l) ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m.
Define
F(x) = −
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t)
−Φi−1(x) =
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(ctt, l
i
t)−
ui(0, 1)
1− βi
Φ1t (x) =
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 − f
(
kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)
)
Φ2it (x) = −cit
Φ3t (x) = −kt
Φ4it (x) = −lit
Φ5it (x) = l
i
t − 1
Ψt = (Φ1t ,Φ
2i
t ,Φ
3
t+1,Φ
4i
t ,Φ
5i
t ), ∀t,∀i = 1, . . . ,m, and Φ = (Φ−1,Ψ)
The Pareto problem can be written as:{
min F(x) | Φ(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m
}
(P )
where:
F : (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m → R ∪ {+∞}
Ψ = (Ψt)t=0,...,∞ : (`∞+ )
m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m → R ∪ {+∞}
Φ−1 = (Φi−1)i=1,...,m : (`
∞
+ )
m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m → R ∪ {+∞}
Let C = dom(F) = {x ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m|F(x) < +∞}
Γ = dom(Φ) = {x ∈ (`∞+ )m × l∞+ × (`∞+ )m|Ψt(x) < +∞, ∀t, and Φi−1(x) < +∞, ∀i}.
The following theorem follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Le Van and
Saglam (2004) (see also Dechert (1982)).
Theorem 1 Let x, y ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m, T ∈ N .
Define xTt (x,y) =
{
xt if t ≤ T
yt if t > T
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Suppose that two following assumptions are satisfied:
T1: If x ∈ C, y ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )mand ∀T ≥ T0, xT (x,y) ∈ C then
F(xT (x,y))→ F(x) when T →∞.
T2: If x ∈ Γ, y ∈ Γ and xT (x,y) ∈ Γ, ∀T ≥ T0,then
a) Φt(xT (x,y))→ Φt(x)as T →∞
b) ∃M s.t . ∀T ≥ T0, ‖Φt(xT (x,y))‖ ≤M
c) ∀N ≥ T0, lim
t→∞[Φt(x
T (x,y))− Φt(y)] = 0
Let x∗ be a solution to (P) and x ∈ C satisfy the Strong Slater condition:
sup
t
Φt(x) < 0.
Suppose xT (x∗,x) ∈ C ∩ Γ. Then, there exist Λ ∈ l1+\{0} such that
F(x) + ΛΦ(x) ≥ F(x∗) + ΛΦ(x∗), ∀x ∈ (`∞)m × `∞ × (`∞)m
and ΛΦ(x∗) = 0.
Obviously, for any η ∈ ∆, an optimal path will depend on η. In what fol-
lows, if possible, we will suppress η and denote by (c∗i,k∗,L∗i, l∗i) any optimal
path for each agent i. The following proposition characterizes the Lagrange
multipliers of the Pareto problem.
Proposition 1 If x∗ = (c∗i,k∗, l∗i) is a solution to the Pareto problem (Q):
then there exist ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, λ = (λi−1, λ1, λ2i, λ3, λ4i, λ5i) ∈ Rm+ × `1+×
(`1+)
m × `1+ × (`1+)m × (`1+)m, λ 6= 0 such that, for any
(
(ci, li),k,L
)
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) +
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λi−1β
t
iu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t )−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t
(
m∑
i=1
c∗it + k
∗
t+1 − f(k∗t , L∗t )
)
+
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λ2it c
∗i
t
∞
+
∑
t=0
λ3tk
∗
t
∞
+
∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λ4it l
∗i
t +
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λ5it (1− l∗it )
≥
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t) +
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λi−1β
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t)−
∞∑
t=0
λ1t
(
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 − f(kt, Lt)
)
+
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λ2it c
i
t
∞
+
∑
t=0
λ3tkt
∞
+
∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λ4it l
i
t +
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
λ5it (1− lit), (1)
λ1t
[
m∑
i=1
c∗it + k
∗
t+1 − f(k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
L∗it )
]
= 0 (2)
λ2it c
∗i
t = 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m (3)
λ3tk
∗
t = 0 (4)
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λ4it l
∗i
t = 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m (5)
λ5it (1− l∗it ) = 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m (6)
λi−1
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t )−
ui(0, 1)
1− βi
]
= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m (7)
0 ∈ (ηi+λi−1)βti∂1ui(c∗it , l∗it )−{λ1t}+{λ2it },∀i = 1, . . . ,m with ηi+λi−1 > 0 (8)
0 ∈ (ηi+λi−1)βti∂2ui(c∗it , l∗it )−λ1t∂2f(k∗t , L∗t )+{λ4it }−{λ5it },∀i with ηi+λi−1 > 0
(9)
0 ∈ λ1t∂1f(k∗t , L∗t ) + {λ3t} − {λ1t−1} (10)
where, L∗t =
∑m
i=1 L
∗i
t =
∑m
i=1(1 − l∗it ), ∂ju(c∗it , l∗it ), ∂jf(k∗t , L∗t ) respectively
denote the projection on the jth component of the subdifferential of function u
at (c∗it , l
∗i
t ) and the function f at (k
∗
t , L
∗
t ).
4
Proof : We show that the Strong Slater condition holds. Since fk(0,m) > 1,5
for all k0 > 0, there exists some k̂ ∈ (0, k0) such that: 0 < k̂ < f(k̂,m) and
0 < k̂ < f(k0,m). Thus, there exists a small positive number ε such that:
0 < k̂ + ε < f(k̂,m− ε) and 0 < k̂ + ε < f(k0,m− ε).
Denote x = (c,k, l) where c = (ci)mi=1, and
ci = (ct
i)t=0,...,∞ = (
ε
m
,
ε
m
,
ε
m
, . . .)
l = (l
i
)mi=1, where
l
i
= (lt
i
)t=0,...,∞ = (
ε
m
,
ε
m
,
ε
m
, . . .).
and k = (k0, k̂, k̂, . . .). We have
Φ10(x) =
m∑
i=0
ci0 + k1 − f
(
k0,
m∑
i=1
(1− li0)
)
= ε+ k̂ − f(k0,m− ε) < 0
Φ11(x) =
m∑
i=0
ci1 + k2 − f
(
k1,
m∑
i=1
(1− li1)
)
= ε+ k̂ − f(k̂,m− ε) < 0
Φ1t (x) = ε+ k̂ − f(k̂,m− ε) < 0, ∀t ≥ 2
Φ2it (x) = −cti = −
ε
m
< 0, ∀t ≥ 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m
Φ30(x) = −k0 < 0,Φ3t (x) = −k̂ < 0 ∀t ≥ 1
4For a concave function f defined on Rn, ∂f(x) denotes the subdifferential of f at x.
5Assumption fk(0, 1) > 1 is equivalent to the Adequacy Assumption in Bewley (1972), see
Le Van and Dana (2003) Remark 6.1.1. This assumption is crucial to have equilibrium prices
in `1+ since it implies that the production set has an interior point. Subsequently, one can use
a separation theorem in the infinite dimensional space to derive Lagrange multipliers.
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Φ4it (x) = −
ε
m
< 0, ∀t ≥ 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m
Φ5it (x) =
ε
m
− 1 < 0,∀t ≥ 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
To show that Φi−1(x) < 0, for any i, we just observe that the Inada condition
limc→0 uic(c, l) = +∞ implies ui( εm , 1 − εm ) > ui(0, 1) if ε is small enough.
Therefore, the Strong Slater condition is satisfied.
It is obvious that, ∀T , xT (x∗, x) belongs to (`∞+ )m × l∞+ × (`∞+ )m. As in Le
Van and Saglam (2004), Assumption T2 is satisfied. We now check Assumption
T1.
For any x˜ ∈ C, ˜˜x ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m such that for any T, xT (x˜, ˜˜x) ∈ C
we have
F(xT (x˜, ˜˜x)) = − T∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(c˜it, l˜it)−
∞∑
t=T+1
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(
˜˜
cit,
˜˜
lit).
As ˜˜x ∈ (`∞+ )m × `∞+ × (`∞+ )m, sup
t
| ˜˜ct| < +∞ , there exists A > 0,∀t, such that
| ˜˜ct| ≤ A. Since βi ∈ (0, 1), as T →∞ we have
0 ≤
∞∑
t=T+1
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(
˜˜
cit,
˜˜
lit) ≤ u(A, 1)
∞∑
t=T+1
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
i = u(A, 1)
m∑
i=1
∞∑
t=T+1
ηiβ
t
i → 0
where u(A, 1) = max{ui(A, 1), i = 1, . . . ,m}. Hence, F(xT (x˜, ˜˜x)) → F(x˜)
when T →∞. Taking account of the Theorem 1, we get (1)-(6).
Obviously, ∩mi=1ri(dom(ui)) 6= ∅ where ri(dom(ui)) is the relative interior of
dom(ui). It follows from the Proposition 6.5.5 in Florenzano and Le Van (2001),
we have
∂
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) = ηiβ
t
i
m∑
i=1
∂ui(c∗it , l
∗i
t ).
We then get (8)-(10) as the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions.
Remark 1 1. We can prove that ηi = 0 ⇒ c∗it = 0, l∗it = 1, ∀t. Indeed,
since the ui are increasing, we have c∗it = 0, for any t. The individual
rationality constraint implies l∗it = 1 for any t. The Inada condition on u
i,
from (8), implies λi−1 = 0. Hence, I = {i : ηi > 0} = {i : ηi + λi−1 > 0}.
It is easy to prove that
∑
i ηi
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) >
∑
i ηi
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iu
i(0, 1).
Therefore, there exists i with ηi > 0 and λi−1 = 0.
2. For any optimal solution (c∗i,k∗, l∗i), we have for any t, any i ∈ I,
∂1u
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) 6= ∅, ∂2ui(c∗it , l∗it ) 6= ∅, ∂1f(k∗t , L∗t ) 6= ∅, ∂2f(k∗t , L∗t ) 6= ∅,
where L∗t = m−
∑
i l
∗i
t .
3. For i ∈ I, we have: c∗it > 0 iff l∗it > 0. In this case, ∂1ui(c∗it , l∗it ) =
{uic(c∗it , l∗it )}, ∂2ui(c∗it , l∗it ) = {uil(c∗it , l∗it )}.
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4. For any k0 > 0, there exists t with
∑
i c
∗i
t > 0 and hence
∑
i l
∗i
t > 0 (if
not,
∑
i ηi
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) =
∑
i ηi
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iu
i(0, 1): contradiction with
the first statement.)
In the following proposition, we will prove the positiveness of the optimal
capital path.
Proposition 2 If k0 > 0, the optimal capital path satisfies k∗t > 0,∀t.
Proof : Let k0 > 0 but assume that k∗1 = 0. From (10), L
∗
1 = 0. This implies∑
i c
∗i
1 = 0 and l
∗i
1 = 1,∀i: a contradiction with (8). Hence k∗1 > 0. By
induction, k∗t > 0,∀t > 0.
Remark 2 From (10) and Proposition 2, if k0 > 0, we have L∗t > 0 for any
t ≥ 0. Hence, for any t ≥ 0, ∂1f(k∗t , L∗t ) = {fk(k∗t , L∗t )}, ∂2f(k∗t , L∗t ) =
{fL(k∗t , L∗t )}.
Proposition 3 Let k0 > 0.
(a) With any η ∈ ∆, there exists a unique solution to the Pareto problem(
(c∗i), (l∗i),k∗
)
. We have: For any t ≥ 0,
λ1t (η) ∈ ∩i∈I (ηi + λi−1)βti∂1ui(c∗it , l∗it ) (11)
λ1t (η)fL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) ∈ ∩i∈I (ηi + λi−1)βti∂2ui(c∗it , l∗it ) (12)
∀t ≥ 1, 0 ∈ λ1t (η)∂1f(k∗t , L∗t )− λ1t−1(η) (13)
and for any i,
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(0, 1)
(b) Conversely, if the sequences c∗i, l∗i,k∗,L∗ satisfy
L∗t =
∑
i
(1− l∗it ), ∀t ≥ 0∑
i
c∗it = f(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )− k∗t+1, ∀t ≥ 0
k∗0 = k0
and for any i,
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t ) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(0, 1)
and if there exist λ1 ∈ `1+, (λi−1) ∈ Rm+ which satisfy (11), (12) and (13),
then c∗i, l∗i,k∗ solve the Pareto problem with weights η and λ1 is an associated
multiplier.
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Proof : It is easy.
Proposition 4 Let k0 > 0. Then there exists a unique multiplier λ1 ∈ `1.
Proof : Existence has been proven. Let us prove uniqueness. First observe
that, from Remark 2, we have ∂1f(k∗t , L
∗
t ) = {fk(k∗t , L∗t )}, ∂2f(k∗t , L∗t ) =
{fL(k∗t , L∗t )}, for every t. We have three cases.
1. If for any t,
∑
i c
∗i
t > 0, then λ
1
t (η) = ηjβ
t
ju
j(c∗jt , l
∗j
t ) with c
∗j
t > 0 and
λj−1 = 0 (see statement 1 of Remark 1).
2. Since k0 > 0 there exists t with
∑
i c
∗i
t > 0.
(a) When
∑
i c
∗i
0 > 0, let T be the first date where
∑
i c
∗i
T = 0 (and hence∑
i l
∗i
T = 0). From t = 0 to t = T − 1, λ1t (η) is uniquely determined.
We have, from (13), λ1T (η)fk(k
∗
T ,m) = λ
1
T−1(η) and λ
1
T (η) is uniquely
determined. But we also have λ1T+1(η)fk(k
∗
T+1, L
∗
T+1) = λ
1
T (η) and
λ1T+1(η) is uniquely determined. By induction, the result holds for
every t.
(b) When
∑
i c
∗i
0 = 0, let T be the first date where
∑
i c
∗i
T > 0. In
this case, λ1T (η) = ηjβ
t
ju
j
c(c
∗j
T , l
∗j
T ) with c
∗j
T > 0. We have, from (13),
λ1T (η)fk(k
∗
T , L
∗
T ) = λ
1
T−1(η) and λ
1
T−1(η) is uniquely determined. By
backward induction λ1t (η) is uniquely determined from 0 to T−1. We
also have λ1T+1(η)fk(k
∗
T+1, L
∗
T+1) = λ
1
T (η) and λ
1
T+1(η) is uniquely
determined. By forward induction, the result holds for every t ≥
T + 1.
Let us denote I = {i |ηi > 0}, β = max{βi|i ∈ I}, I1 = {i ∈ I | βi = β} and
I2 = {i ∈ I | βi < β}. We now show that the consumption and leisure paths of
all agents with a discount factor less than the maximum one converge to zero.
The proof is very simple compared to the one in Le Van, et al. (2007) which
uses the supermodular structure inspired by lattice programming.
Proposition 5 If (k∗, c∗i, l∗i) denotes the optimal path starting from k0, then
∀i ∈ I2, c∗it −→ 0 and l∗it −→ 0.
Proof : First observe that any Individually Rational Pareto Optimum ((c∗, l∗,k∗))
is also a Pareto Optimum without the Individually Rationality Constraint. That
means there exists η ∈ ∆ such that ((c∗, l∗,k∗)) solve
max
m∑
i=1
ηi
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(cit, l
i
t) (Q)
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s.t.
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ f
(
kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)
)
,∀t
cit ≥ 0, lit ≥ 0, lit ≤ 1, ∀i,∀t
kt ≥ 0, ∀t, k0 given.
For this problem, one can show that ηi = 0 implies that the sequences of optimal
consumptions and leisures equal to 0.
Consider problem Rt
Vt(kt, kt+1) = max
m∑
i=1
ηiβ
t
iu
i(cit, l
i
t)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ F
(
kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)
)
+ (1− δ)kt.
It is easy to see that the Pareto problem is equivalent to
max
∞∑
t=0
Vt(kt, kt+1)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ F (kt,m) + (1− δ)kt, ∀t ≥ 0
k0 is given.
Observe that
Vt(kt, kt+1) = βt max
m∑
i=1
ηi
(
βi
β
)t
ui(cit, l
i
t)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
cit + kt+1 ≤ F
(
kt,
m∑
i=1
(1− lit)
)
+ (1− δ)kt.
Denote Zt =
(
ηi(βiβ )
t
)
. From the Berge Maximum Theorem (1959), the
strict concavity and the increasingness of the utility functions, the optimal
c∗i, l∗i are continuous with respect to (Zt, kt, kt+1). Denote these functions by(
Γi(Zt, k∗t , k
∗
t+1),Λ
i(Zt, k∗t , k
∗
t+1)
)
i
. Let κ∗, ξ∗ denote the limit points of k∗t , k
∗
t+1
when t→ +∞. Then, for i ∈ I2, Γi(Zt, k∗t , k∗t+1) converges to Γi(0I2 , (ηi)i∈I2 , κ∗, ξ∗) =
0, and Λi(Zt, k∗t , k
∗
t+1) converges to Λ
i(0I2 , (ηi)i∈I2 , κ
∗, ξ∗) = 0.
3 Existence of competitive equilibrium
We have proved that there exist Lagrange multipliers
(
(λi−1)i, λ(η)
)
, with (λi−1)i ∈
Rm+ and
λ(η) = (λ1(η), λ2i(η), λ3(η), λ4i(η), λ5i(η))
∈ `1+ × (`1+)m × `1+ × (`1+)m × (`1+)m, i = 1...m,
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for the Pareto problem. In what follow, we will prove that, with given (c∗,
k∗, l∗,L∗), one can associate a sequence of prices, (p∗t )
∞
t=0, and a sequence of
wages, (w∗t )
∞
t=0, defined as
p∗t = λ
1
t , ∀t
w∗t = λ
1
tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ), ∀t
where fL(k∗t , L
∗
t ) ∈ ∂2f(k∗t , L∗t ), and a price r > 0 for the initial capital stock
k0 such that (c∗,k∗, l∗,L∗,p∗,w∗, r) is a price equilibrium with transfers (see
Definition 2 below). The appropriate transfer to each consumer is the amount
that just allows the consumer to afford the consumption stream allocated by
the social optimization problem. Thus, for given weight η ∈ ∆, the required
transfers are:
φi(η) =
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (η)c
i∗
t (η) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)l
i∗
t (η)−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)−ϑirk0 − αipi∗(η)
where
pi∗(η) =
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (η)[f(k
∗
t (η), L
∗
t (η))− k∗t+1(η)]−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)L
∗
t (η)− rk0.
According to the Negishi approach, a competitive equilibrium for this economy
corresponds to a set of welfare weights η ∈ ∆ such that these transfers equal to
zero. Now we define an equilibrium with transfers.
Definition 2 A given allocation {c∗i,k∗, l∗i,L∗i}, together with a price se-
quence p∗ for consumption good, a wage sequence w∗ for labor and a price
r for the initial capital stock k0 constitute an equilibrium with transfers if
i)
c∗ ∈ (`∞+ )m, l∗ ∈ (`∞+ )m,L∗ ∈ (`∞+ )m,k∗ ∈ `∞+ ,
p∗ ∈ `1+\{0},w∗ ∈ `1+\{0}, r > 0
ii) For every i = 1, . . . ,m, (c∗i, l∗i) is a solution to the problem
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(cit, l
i
t)
st
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
i
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
i
t ≤
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
∗i
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
∗i
t
iii) (k∗,L∗) is a solution to the firm’s problem:
pi∗ = max
∞∑
t=0
p∗t [f(kt, Lt)− kt+1]−
∞∑
t=0
w∗tLt − rk0
s.t . 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt, Lt), 0 ≤ Lt,∀t
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iv) Markets clear
m∑
i=1
c∗it + k
∗
t+1 = f
(
k∗t ,
m∑
i=1
L∗it
)
, ∀t,
L∗t =
m∑
i=1
L∗it , l
∗i
t = 1− L∗it and k∗0 = k0.
The differences between two definitions - competitive equilibrium and price
equilibrium with transfers - are the budget constraints of consumers. If the
transfers φi(η) = 0 for all i, a price equilibrium with transfers is a competitive
equilibrium.
Before proving existence of an equilibrium, we will first prove that any solu-
tion to the Pareto problem, x∗ = (c∗i,k∗, l∗i), associated with k0 > 0 and η ∈ ∆
is an equilibrium with transfers, with some appropriate prices (p∗t ) ∈ `1+ \ {0}
and wages (w∗t ) ∈ `1+ \ {0}.
The following result is required.
Proposition 6 Let k0 > 0.
1. For any ε > 0, there exists T such that, for any η ∈ ∆,
+∞∑
T
λ1t(η)
∑
i
c∗it ≤ ε
+∞∑
T
λ1t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t )
∑
i
l∗it ≤ ε
+∞∑
T
λ1t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t ) ≤ ε.
2. There exists M such that, for any η ∈ ∆,
+∞∑
t=0
λ1t(η)
∑
i
c∗it ≤ M
+∞∑
t=0
λ1t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t )
∑
i
l∗it ≤ M
+∞∑
t=0
λ1t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t ) ≤ M.
Proof : 1. We know that there exists A such that c∗it (η) ≤ A, ∀t, ∀i, ∀η ∈ ∆.
Therefore
βT
1− β
∑
i
ui(A, 1) ≥
+∞∑
T
∑
i
ηiβ
t
i [u
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t )− ui(0, 0)]
≥
+∞∑
T
λ1t
∑
i
c∗it +
+∞∑
T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
∑
i
l∗it .
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Let ε > 0. There exists T such that β
T
1−β ≤ ε. Hence,
∑+∞
T λ
1
t(η)
∑
i c
∗i
t ≤ ε,∑+∞
T λ
1
t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t )
∑
i l
∗i
t ≤ ε, for any η.
We now prove that for T large enough,
∑+∞
T λ
1
t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t ) ≤ ε for any
η. We have ∑
i
c∗it = f(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )− k∗t+1.
Since
f(k∗t , L
∗
t ) = f(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )− f(0, 0) ≥ fk(k∗t , L∗t )k∗t + fL(k∗t , L∗t )L∗t ,
we obtain by using (10):
T+τ∑
t=T
λ1t
∑
i
c∗it ≥ λ1T fk(k∗T , L∗T )k∗T − λ1T+τk∗T+τ+1 +
T+τ∑
t=T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
∗
t .
Let τ → +∞. Since λ1 ∈ `1, and k∗t ≤ max{k0, k¯},∀t, we have
+∞∑
t=T
λ1t
∑
i
c∗it ≥ λ1T fk(k∗T , L∗T )k∗T +
+∞∑
t=T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
∗
t
≥
+∞∑
t=T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
∗
t =
+∞∑
t=T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )(m−
∑
i
l∗it )(14)
Hence, for T large enough,
m
+∞∑
t=T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) ≤
+∞∑
t=T
λ1t
∑
i
c∗it +
+∞∑
t=T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
∑
i
l∗it ≤ ε
for any η.
2. Obviously:
+∞∑
0
λ1t
∑
i
c∗it +
+∞∑
0
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
∑
i
l∗it ≤ M1 =
1
1− β
∑
i
ui(A, 1) (15)
+∞∑
t=0
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) ≤ M2 =
2
m
× 1
1− β
∑
i
ui(A, 1).
Proposition 7 Let k0 > 0. Let (k∗, c∗,L∗, l∗) solve the Pareto problem asso-
ciated with η ∈ ∆. Take
p∗t = λ
1
t , w
∗
t = λ
1
tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) for any t
and r = λ10[Fk(k0, 0) + 1− δ].
Then {c∗,k∗,L∗,p∗,w∗, r} is an equilibrium with transfers.
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Proof :
i) We have
c∗ ∈ (`∞+ )m, l∗ ∈ (`∞+ )m,k∗ ∈ `∞+ ,p∗ ∈ `1+,w∗ ∈ `1+.
From Remark 1 statement 4, p∗ 6= 0, and together with Remark 2, w∗ 6= 0.
ii) We now show that (c∗i, l∗i) solves the consumer’s problem. Let (ci, li)
satisfy
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
i
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
i
t ≤
∞∑
t=0
p∗t c
∗i
t +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t l
∗i
t .
Let
∆ =
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗it , l
∗i
t )−
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i(cit, l
i
t)
Since ui is concave, from Proposition 3, statement (a), we have
∆ ≥
∞∑
t=0
λ1t
ηi + λi−1
(c∗it − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
ηi + λi−1
(l∗it − lit)
=
∞∑
t=0
p∗t
ηi + λi−1
(c∗it − cit) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t
ηi + λi−1
(l∗it − lit) ≥ 0.
This means (c∗i, l∗i) solves the consumer’s problem.
iii) We now show that (k∗,L∗) is solution to the firm’s problem. Since
p∗t = λ
1
t , w
∗
t = λ
1
tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ), we have
pi∗ =
∞∑
t=0
λ1t [f(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )− k∗t+1]−
∞∑
t=0
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) L
∗
t − rk0.
Let :
∆T =
T∑
t=0
λ1t [f(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )− k∗t+1]−
T∑
t=0
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) L
∗
t − rk0
−
(
T∑
t=0
λ1t [f(kt, Lt)− kt+1]−
T∑
t=0
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )Lt − rk0
)
By the concavity of f , we get
∆T ≥
T∑
t=1
λ1tfk(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )(k
∗
t − kt)−
T∑
t=0
λ1t (k
∗
t+1 − kt+1)
= [λ11fk(k
∗
1 , L
∗
1)− λ10](k∗1 − k1) + . . .
+[λ1T fk(k
∗
T , L
∗
T )− λ1T−1](k∗T − kT )− λ1T (k∗T+1 − kT+1).
From Proposition 3, statement (b), we have:
∆T ≥ −λ1T (k∗T+1 − kT+1) = −λ1T k∗T+1 + λ1T kT+1 ≥ −λ1T k∗T+1.
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Since λ1 ∈ `1+, sup
T
k∗T+1 < +∞, we have
lim
T→+∞
∆T ≥ lim
T→+∞
− λ1T k∗T+1 = 0.
We have proved that the sequences (k∗,L∗) maximize the profit of the firm.
Finally, the market is cleared as the utility function is strictly increasing.
Let k0 > 0. From Proposition 4, we define the following mapping
φi(η) =
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (η)c
∗i
t (η) +
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)l
∗i
t (η)−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)−ϑirk0 − αipi∗(η)
where
p∗t = λ
1
t , w
∗
t = λ
1
tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ),∀t
pi∗(η) =
∞∑
t=0
p∗t (η)[f(k
∗
t (η), L
∗
t (η))− k∗t+1(η)]−
∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η)L
∗
t (η)− rk0.
This mapping φi is uniformly bounded (see Proposition 6, statement 2).
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 2 Assume U1, U2, U3, F1, F2, F3. Let k0 > 0. Then there
exists η ∈ ∆, η >> 0, such that φi(η) = 0,∀i . This means there exists a
competitive equilibrium.
Proof : We first prove that φi is continuous for any i. Let (ηn)→ η. Since,
c∗it (η
n)→ c∗it (η), l∗it (ηn)→ l∗it (η), k∗t (ηn)→ k∗t (η),
and if
∑
j c
∗j
t (η) > 0 then p∗t (η
n) → p∗t (η), w∗t (ηn) → w∗t (η). It remains to be
proven that p∗t (η
n) → p∗t (η), w∗t (ηn) → w∗t (η) even when
∑
j c
∗j
t (η) = 0. Let
T = {t : ∑j c∗jt (η) = 0}. From the proof in Proposition 6, there exists M such
that for any η ∈ ∆,
+∞∑
t=0
w∗t (η) =
+∞∑
t=0
λ1t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t ) ≤M
and for any ε > 0, there exists T0 such that, for any η ∈ ∆, for any T ≥ T0,
+∞∑
T
w∗t (η) =
+∞∑
T
λ1t(η)fL(k∗t , L
∗
t ) ≤ ε
These inequalities show that {w∗(ηn)} is in a relatively compact set of `1. We
can assume that it converges to (w¯t) ∈ `1. From (13), for t ∈ T , λ1t (ηn)→ λ¯1t =
w¯t
fL(k∗t ,m)
.
When
∑
j c
∗j
0 (η) > 0, consider T , the first date where
∑
j c
∗j
T (η) = 0. For
t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we have λ1t (ηn) → λ1t (η). Since λ1T (ηn)fL(k∗T (ηn), L∗t (ηn)) =
17
λ1T−1(η
n), we have λ¯1tfL(k
∗
T (η),m) = λ
1
T−1(η). From Proposition 4, and relation
(13), we have λ¯1T = λ
1
T (η). In other words, λ
1
T (η
n) → λ1T (η). By induction,
λ1t (η
n)→ λ1t (η) for any t ≥ T .
Use the same arguments to prove that λ1t (η
n) → λ1t (η) for any t, when∑
j c
∗j
0 (η) = 0.
From these results we get w¯t = w∗t (η) for any t.
It follows from (14) and (15) in Proposition 6 that for any η ∈ ∆, any T
βT
1− β
∑
i
ui(A, 1) ≥
+∞∑
t=T
λ1t
∑
i
c∗it ≥
+∞∑
T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )L
∗
t
or
2βT
1− β
∑
i
ui(A, 1) ≥
+∞∑
t=T
λ1t
∑
i
(
c∗it + fL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )l
∗i
t
) ≥ m+∞∑
T
λ1tfL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t ) (16)
Let ε > 0. From inequality (16), there exists T such that for any n we have:
|
∑
t≥T
p∗t (η
n)c∗it (η
n) +
∑
t≥T
w∗t (η
n)l∗it (η
n)
−
∑
t≥T
w∗t (η
n)−ϑirk0 − αi
∑
t≥T
p∗t (η
n)
∑
i
c∗it (η
n)
−
∑
t≥T
w∗t (η
n)(m−
∑
i
l∗it (η
n))− rk0| ≤ ε
and
|
∑
t≥T
p∗t (η)c
∗i
t (η) +
∑
t≥T
w∗t (η)l
∗i
t (η)
−
∑
t≥T
w∗t(η)−ϑir∗(η)k0 − αi
∑
t≥T
p∗t(η)
∑
i
c∗it (η)
−
∑
t≥T
w∗t(η)(m−
∑
i
l∗it (η))− r∗(η)k0| ≤ ε
Consider t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. One has: p∗t (ηn) → p∗t(η), w∗t (ηn) → w∗t (η),
c∗it (η
n) → c∗it (η), l∗it (ηn) → l∗it (η), k∗t (ηn) → k∗t (η). Thus, for n large enough,
we have |φi(ηn)− φi(η)| ≤ 3ε. The proof that φi is continuous is complete.
Observe that
∑
i φi(η) = 0 by Walras law. It follows from remark 1.1 that
ηi = 0 ⇒ φi(η) < 0. Let Ψi(η) = ηi − φi(η). We then have
∑
i Ψi(η) = 1
and ηi = 0 ⇒ Ψi(η) > 0. The mapping Ψ = (Ψ1, ...,Ψm) satisfies the inward
boundary fixed-point theorem. There exists η ∈ ∆, η >> 0 such that Ψ(η) = η,
or equivalently φi(η) = 0,∀i.
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